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Chapter 8
An International Comparison of the
Financing of Occupational Pensions
E. Philip Davis
This chapter analyzes the diverse scope of private pension funding, pen-
sion investments, and the risks and returns obtained in the capital mar-
kets in 12 major industrial countries-the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany,Japan, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Den-
mark, Sweden, Australia, and Switzerland. I The marked differences in
national experience raise a number of economic issues, which 1 seek to
address. For example, it aims to consider the role of private funding in
retirement financing relative to social security, the role of government
regulation of pension funds' financing; and appropriate contribution
rates to private pensions. There are clear links between these issues: for
example, regulations may influence appropriate contribution rates (via
asset returns), and they may also influence the scope of funding itself.
This chapter seeks to illustrate the varying choices made in this field
Ly the countries concerned, their benefits and costs, and their conse-
quences for the scope and efficiency of the privately funded sector. In this
discussion I first consider the arguments for and against private pension
funding per se, before outlining the differences in the scope of funding
between the major countries and their determinants. I then assess the
differing regulation of pension fund financing and the performance of
funds in capital markets; together these enable an assessment to be made
of appropriate contribution rates.
Before commencing, I offer four key definitions. In a funded pension
plan, pension commitments are covered in advance by accumulation of
real or financial assets. In pay-as-you-go plans, by contrast, contributions
of employers and current employees are relied on to pay pensions di-
rectly. Social security systems are pay~as-you-go in most countries, while
private pension plans tend to be funded. In a defined benefit pension
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plan the pension formula is defined in advance by the sponsor, indepen-
dently of the contributions and asset returns. In contrast, in defined
contribution pension plans only contributions are fixed, and benefits
therefore depend solely on the returns on the assets of the fund. The key
difference between defined benefit and defined contribution plans is
that with defined benefit plans there can be risk sharing between worker
and company as well as between younger and older members.2 These
risk-sharing features are absent with defined contribution plans.
Why Fund Pensions?
The costs and benefits of funded occupational pensions can be shown in
the context of the economic issues raised by the overall choice between
funding and pay-as-you-go. Under the simplifYing "steady state" assump-
tions of a constant population and population distribution, with pension
contributions proportionate to salary, and benefits proportionate to con-
tributions,3 the transfers received by pensioners under pay-as-you-go rela-
tive to their contributions earlier in their working lives depend on the
growth ofaverage earnings (which determines the growth in total contri-
butions by the workforce). Meanwhile the corresponding growth of re-
ceipts under funding depends on the rate ofreturn on the assets accumu-
lated during the working life. In other words, the "rate of return" to pay-
as-you-go is indicated by earnings growth, and that of funding by the
return on physical and financial assets (Aaron 1966).4 The actual pension
received per annum under pay-as-you-go also depends on the ratio of
contributing workers to pensioners (the dependency ratio), while that
received in the case of funding varies with the number of years of retire-
ment relative to working age (the passivity ratio).5 Allowing for popUla-
tion growth, the steady state rate of return to pay-as-you-go increases to
the growth rate of average earnings plus population growth (i.e., total
earnings).
The reasoning above implies, ceteris paribus, that funding can offer
higher total benefits to retirees for the same outlay ifasset returns exceed
the growth rate of average earnings (or, with constant factor shares, that
of productivity and real GOP). Historical experience and economic the-
ory suggest this will generally be the case.6 Data in Table 1 indeed suggest
that, in most of the countries studied, asset returns over 1970-90 did
exceed growth in average earnings; hence underlying economic condi-
tions favored funding even in a steady state, particularly if international
diversification of investment is permitted where domestic returns are
relatively low. Risk may be a partially offsetting factor favoring pay-as-you-
go relative to funding, if asset returns are more volatile than growth in
the wage bill and the dependency ratio. Risk is particularly important to
TABLE 1 Indicators of the Comparative Advantage of Pay-as-You-Go versus Funding (percentage)
Ratio
Average ojPopulation
Population Growth Rate Real Return Real Return Real Return over 65/15
Growth ojReal Average to Pay-as-You-Go on Balanced from Pension Real Return to 65 in 1980
Country (1970-90) Earnings in Steady State' Portfolio' Funds' on Equity' and 2050
United Kingdom 0.1 2.6 2.7 3.7 5.8 8.1 23.1/30.4
United States 1.0 0.2 1.2 2.8 2.2 4.7 18.7/31.8
Canada 1.1 1.7 2.8 2.2 1.6 4.5 16.8/36.4
Japan 0.85 4.2 5.05 5.3 4.0 10.9 16.6/37.6
Germany -0.5 4.0 3.5 6.2 5.1 9.5 22.5/42.3
Netherlands 0.6 2.4 3.0 4.2 4.0 7.9 18.5/38.1
Sweden 0.15 1.5 1.65 3.7 0.2 8.4 27.4/35.8
Denmark 0.2 2.8 3.0 4.6 3.6 7.0 22.7/39.8
Switzerland 0.2 1.9 2.1 2.0 1.5 6.2 25.0/46.0
Australia 1.45 0.7 2.15 2.8 1.6 8.1 16.6/32.0
France 0.5 4.0 4.5 4.9 n/a 9.4 21.0/37.8
Italy 0.35 3.3 3.65 2.0 n/a 4.0 20.3/37.8
Chile 1.65 6.6 8.25 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Singapore 1.3 3.6 4.9 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Source: Davis (I 994a) .
Notes: 'Sum of popUlation growth and earnings growth.
'40 percent domestic equities, 40 percent domestic bonds, 10 percent foreign equities, 10 percent foreign bonds.
'Average 1967-90 (see Table 6).
'Average 1967-90 (see Table 6).
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defined contribution funds as there is no back-up from the sponsor and
pensions must typically be taken in a lump sum (to buy an annuity) at the
precise point of retirement.
In practice, the calculations in Table 1 are excessively favorable to pay-
as-you-go since the key assumption of the steady state - a fixed popula-
tion distribution-will not be fulfilled in the coming decades. Slower
population growth and aging of the population will put increasing strain
on pay-as-you-go systems. In terms of the analysis above, the dependency
ratio is set to rise sharply relative to the passivity ratio, driving down the
rate of return to pay-as-you-go relative to funding, other things being
equal.7 In line with this, the OECD (1993) calculates that, under pay-as-
you-go, contribution ratios in the G-7 countries would have to rise to a
peak of 4.4 to 11.9 percent of GDP to eliminate net liabilities of social
security, whereas for funding it would have to rise 1.1 to 5.3 percent, and
the overall cost would be lower to the extent that the return on financial
assets exceeds the growth of average earnings.8 Such problems are lead-
ing governments to seek to reduce social security promises, thus also
showing the "political risks" to which social security is vulnerable when
labor market conditions are unfavorable. However, if there were to be
crises in the capital market equivalent to this "crisis in the labor market,"
funded plans could equally be disadvantaged.9
There are also differences in the implications of the alternative ap-
proaches for economic efficiency. If pay-as-you-go social security contri-
butions are seen as taxes, they will distort the labor supply decision, which
is particularly likely if the rates of contribution are high and there is a
great deal of redistribution; this does not occur with funding to such an
extent. Again, pay-as-you-go may discourage saving and hence capital
formation, notably for the first generation of recipients. This in turn
makes labor relatively abundant in relation to capital, reducing the wage
and raising the interest rate, thus reducing the welfare of future genera-
tions (Kotlikoff 1992). In the context ofan aging population, ifcontribu-
tion rates under pay-as-you-go are not adjusted sufficiently to allow for
benefits, fiscal deficits will be engendered, which may lead to crowding
out of private investment. Even if deficits do not occur, pay-as-you-go with
an aging population implies net unfunded government liabilities, which
could again have crowding-{)ut effects on investment. Meanwhile, fund-
ing tends under certain plausible conditions to increase saving, thus
lowering the interest rate and raising the capital stock and hence future
output for both workers and pensioners. Indeed, as noted by Estelle
James and Dimitri Vittas in Chapter 5, the conditions under which fund-
ing will have a positive effect on saving, namely myopia, credit rationing,
and lack of credibility of the pension plan, are precisely those whose
absence will lead pay-as-you-go to reduce saving. So a switch from pay-as-
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you-go to funding is unambiguously likely to raise saving. If higher saving
engenders capital investment, which itself raises productivity (e.g., by
introducing new working methods), the overall economic growth rate
may be endogenously boosted (Romer 1986). Funding can also benefit
the capital markets via the composition of saving (in long-term instru-
ments such as equities and bonds), notably if asset allocation is decen-
tralized, as is the case for private pension funds.
There are nevertheless some arguments against funding. Funded pen-
sion plans may be vulnerable to confiscatory taxation or diversion of
investment to unprofitable projects or asset categories for political rea-
sons. Funding may adversely influence the exchange rate and the current
account if ex-ante domestic investment is less than the increase in saving.
The increase in saving may over the very long term depress the domestic
rate of return to capital; in other words the return on assets may be
affected by the scope offunding, reducing its advantage relative to pay-as-
you-go, although international investment in countries with a younger
population can in principle offset this problem. lO
A transition from pay-as-you-go to funding can be difficult because one
generation has to "pay twice": once for existing pensioners via pay-as-you-
go, and once for their own pensions via funding. Also, in a closed econ-
omy, and abstracting from the increase in saving that funding may in-
duce, the problem of competition over domestic resources raised by the
intergenerational transfers inherent in pay-as-you-go is not entirely re-
moved by funding. Instead it is switched from pensioners seeking a share
of labor income (via taxation) to claims over the returns on the capital
stock (Vittas 1992).'1 But again international investment can mitigate
this problem. Pay-as-you-go plans can offer immediate pensions without
waiting for assets to build up, and hence are more favorable to the first
generation after their introduction than funded plans. They can remove
inflation risk to pensioners by being able to link future benefits to wages
(assuming a steady-state in the economy with positive population and
productivity growth). Pay-as-you-go may be superior in terms of insur-
ance of risks to labor and capital income (factor share risk), since in its
absence workers tend to be wholly dependent on labor income and pen-
sioners on capital income. 12
From a welfare point of view funding may be objectionable for imer-
generational equity where some redistribution may bejustified, for exam-
ple, if the growth rate is rapid and the young are much more productive
and therefore have higher incomes than the elderly (Pestieau 1992). This
is because, with funding, no transfers are possible between generations to
compensate for a changing economic environment. With an actuarially
fair funded plan, there can also be problems ofequity within generations
whereby well-paid workers and those who stay with one firm benefit dis-
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proportionately from the fiscal benefits offered, whereas groups with
broken work histories may get an inadequate net income. 13 Only social
security is able to redistribute to offset poverty within generations.
As regards methods of funding, a social security trust fund may face
particular problems, which makes private funding relatively attractive
(Thompson 1992). A large trust fund may induce higher government
consumption or even fiscal deficits, thus defeating the object of the ex-
ercise, and its management could be subject to political interference
(although it could be privatized or devolved). Investment in government
bonds, which is typical of such funds in the United States, Japan, and
Singapore, has ambiguous consequences. As pointed out by Bodie and
Merton (1993), it is not clear that governments' willingness to repay
bonds (or at least, not to devalue them by a bout of inflation) should be
any more reliable than the promise to pay pensions, unless the funds are
used for productive capital investment, with revenues hypothecated to
pay pensions. Even if used to fund investment, finance may be diverted to
unprofitable projects for political reasons. Also, lack of international
investment, which is typical of such funds, leaves them dependent on the
performance of the domestic economy. Investmen t performance of one
such public trust fund, the ATP fund in Sweden, is examined below.
To summarize, these arguments suggest that funding is superior in
terms of economic efficiency (e.g., less distortion of incentives to work
and save), so a shift from pay-as-you-go to funding may raise work incen-
tives and saving. Also the rate of return to funded plans tends to exceed
that on pay-as-you-go plans. However, funding has some disadvantages in
terms of equity that suggest that a wholesale switch to funding would
be inappropriate. Diversification reasons (the differing risks to which
funded and pay-as-you-go plans are exposed) are also a point in favor of
retaining pay-as-you-go. The ability of social security to redistribute sug-
gests a role for pay-as-you-go in providing basic needs, while funding
caters for transfer of saving to old age. And in ternational investment may
be needed to mitigate some of the difficulties that funding may entail
with an aging population. With these considerations as background,
we go on to examine the actual determinants of private funding in 12
countries.
What Determines the Scale of Private Pension Funding?
The data in Table 2 show pension fund assets in the twelve countries
studied, first on a narrow definition of funded non-insured company
plans, and secondly on a broader definition including pension funds
managed by life insurers and certain other funded plans. For each mea-
sure, a contrast is apparent between the role of pension funds in the
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TABLE 2 Assets oEPension Funds End oE 1991 (US$ billion)
Narrow Definition I Broad Definition2
Stock ofAssets % ofPersonal %of Stock ofAssets % ofPersonal %0/
ClJUntry (end of 1991) Sector Assets CDP (end of1991) Sector Assets CDP
United States 2,915 22 51 3,780 29 66
United Kingdom 643 27 60 786 33 73
Germany 59 3 3 80' 4 4
Japan 182 2 5 303' 3 8
Canada 187 17 32 205 19 35
Netherlands 145 26 46 242 43 76
Sweden 87 nla 33
Denmark 22 nla 16 82 nla 60
Switzerland 173 nla 70
Australia 62 19 22 110 34 39
Source: Davis (l994a).
Notes: IJnclurles only independent (private and public sector) funded pension schemes. except Sweden-
public ATP scheme.
2For the United States, Australia. Canada and Denmark includes data for pension reserves of life
insurers; for the United Kingdom andJapan includes estimates ofHfe insurance companies' pension
fund reserves; for Denmark includes funds managed by banks; for the Netherlands includes the Civil
Service Pension Fund (ABP).
'In Germany andJapan there are large reserve funded (or "booked") pension plans with assets held
directly on the sponsoring firm's balance sheet. The value of these in 1991 was US$ 150 billion in
Germany and an estimated US$ 120 billion inJapan.
Anglo-Saxon countries (the United Kingdom, the United States, Aus-
tralia, and Canada), the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland, where
they account for a sizable part of personal sector wealth and GDP, versus
that role in other continental European countries such as Germany.
Japan occupies an intermediate position, with sizable total assets but low
ratios to personal wealth or GDP. Note the Swedish data are for the
funded earnings-related social security system (ATP); private funded
plans exist, but their assets are relatively small.
Taking the asset/GDP ratio as an imperfect proxy for the size of the
funded sector, what types of influences could account for the differences
in the importance of funded sectors in the provision of pensions? The
most crucial point is that private funded plans cannot usefully be viewed
in isolation; the principal alternative to a private pension fund is the state
social security pension system. Not surprisingly, the growth of private
plans can be related to the scale of social security pension provision,
which imposes limits on private sector plans, particularly if there is gen-
erous provision for individuals at higher income levels. Second, where
provision is voluntary, taxation and regulatory provisions make it more or
less attractive for the firm to offer a pension fund. For example, exemp-
tion of funds from taxation, "prudent man" rules for asset management,
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and flexible funding rules will increase funds' attractiveness. However, in
some countries these factors may be overridden, imposing compulsory
pension plans on employers. Since accrued rights within occupational
pension plans comprise assets of the employee, it is natural also to con-
sider their motivations. For example, high marginal tax rates may in-
crease the attraction to employees of tax deferral via pension funds.
Employees will also be attracted by the quality of retirement income
insurance that is on offer, which differs between defined benefit and
defined contribution plans and varies with factors such as indexation of
pensions to prices or wages (Bodie 1990). But note that regulations mak-
ing funds attractive to employees, such as compulsory indexation and
short vesting periods, may make them less attractive to employers.
Of course not all funds are company-based. Personal pensions, which
are invariably defined contribution plans, have grown in importance in a
number of countries in recent years, the main aims being to provide the
tax incentives of pension plans to those not in company plans, to enable
company plans to be supplemented, and/or to offer greater portability
than is available from company plans. A further factor influencing the
size of pension funds is the maturity of the plans, that is, whether they
have a stable long-run ratio of contributing to benefiting members. Cov-
erage is obviously also important (i.e., the proportion of employees cov-
ered by pension plans). However, this is a consequence of the economic
features as discussed below, rather than a separate cause of growth in
itself.
Accrual of pension rights in a defined contribution plan is synonymous
with accumulation of assets, which will thus be larger the higher the
contribution rate, coverage of the workforce, and rates of return. But a
defined benefit plan is not necessarily synonymous with a fund; rather it
is a way to collateralize the firm's benefit promise. In order for assets to be
built up, it is essential for fiscal or regulatory provisions to encourage
funding of defined benefits; otherwise defined benefit plans may be un-
funded. Only ifexternal funding is encouraged, as opposed to "booking"
of pension liabilities on the balance sheet, will funds be available in the
form ofassets ofthe capital market intermediated via pension funds. And
only then one can one also assert for defined benefit funds that the more
generous the benefits offered and the wider the coverage, the more fi-
nancial assets funds will require.
Table 3 offers a summary of the way these various features stand in the
twelve countries studied. To summarize, the influence on the develop-
ment of private plans of the scale of social security, compulsion, the tax
regime, and maturity can be discerned in each country. Key regulatory
features that may also influence funding, notably funding rules per se,
are assessed in more detail in the next section.
TABLE 3 Determinants of the Size of Funded Sectors
Country
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
Japan
Canada
Social
Security
Replacement
Rate1992
(%)1
65-40
50-26'
70-59
544
344
Form ofTaxation'
EET - Contributions and asset returns tax free. Bene-
fits taxed.
EET - Contributions and asset returns tax free. Bene-
fits taxed. except for tax free lump sum.
TET -Employers' contributions taxed as wages; em-
ployees' contributions and asset returns tax free.
Benefits taxed at low rate. (For booked benefits.
employers contributions tax free, benefits taxed at
normal rate.)
ETT - Contributions tax free. Tax on asset returns.
Benefits taxed, except for tax free lump sum. (Par-
tial tax exemption of contributions to booked bene-
fits.)
EET -Contributions and asset returns tax free. Bene-
fits taxed.
Coverage
ofFunded
Schemes (%)
46 (voluntary)
50 (company)
25 (personal);
(voluntary)
42 (voluntary)
50 (voluntary)
41 (voluntary)
Maturity
ofFunded
Schemes
Mature
Mature
Immature
Immature
Mature
Netherlands
Sweden
Denmark
Switzerland
Australia
France
Italy
66-26
69-49
83-33
82-47
28-11
67-45'
77-73
EET - Contributions and asset returns tax free. Bene-
fits taxed.
ETT - Contributions to ATP tax free; contributions to
ITP/STP subject to social security tax. Tax on asset
returns ofITP/STP. Benefits taxed at low rate.
ETT - Contributions tax free. Tax on real asset re-
turns. Benefits taxed, induding 40% oflump sum
payments.
EET - Contributions and asset returns tax free. Bene-
fits taxed.
TTT - Contributions, asset returns and benefits
taxed.
E(E)T -Contributions to ARRCO/AGIRC tax free;
separate funded schemes forbidden; insured pen-
sion contributions tax free.
EET - Contributions and asset returns tax free, bene-
fits taxed.
83 (voluntary)
90 (ATP compulsory;
ITP/STP voluntary)
50 (voluntary)
90 (compulsory)
92 (compulsory)
100 (compulsory)
5 (voluntary)
Mature
Mature
Mature
Mature
(pre-BVG)
Immature
(post-BVG)
Immature
Mature
Immature
Source: Davis (I 994a) .
Notes: 1Based on final salary ofUS$ 20,000 and US$ 50.000, for married man; source Wyatt (1993).
2The abbreviations refer to taxation of contributions, returns and benefits, hence EET means contributions and returns are exempt and benefits are
taxed.
'Includes state earnings related pension scheme (SERPs). For those contracted out, the ratios are 35% and 14%.
4Ratio to average earnings in ]986.
'Includes ARRCO.
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As regards social security, replacement ratios are shown to be relatively
low in Australia, which is a country that relies heavily on private pensions
even for low earners, but comparable for those on low incomes in other
countries. In such cases, the shape of the relation of replacement ratio to
final earnings is a crucial determinant of the scope of private funds; if
social security provides high replacement ratios to high earners, there
will be little incentive to develop private funded plans at all. In line with
this suggestion, the replacement ratio declines rapidly with earnings in
Denmark, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United King-
dom - countries with large funded sectors. Italy and Germany, by con-
trast, are notable for comparable replacement ratios to those retiring on
earnings equivalent to US$ 20,000 and US$ 50,000. Their private funded
sectors are much less important.
As regards taxation, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Switzer-
land, the United States, and Canada offer generous treatment (exemp-
tion of contributions and asset returns from tax, while pensions in pay-
ment are taxed, denoted EET in Table 3). "Booking" is discouraged in
these countries by withholding tax privileges from reserve-funded plans
(or outright bans, as in the United States and Canada). High general tax
rates of up to 68 percent, as in Denmark, can encourage private funding
even if their fiscal treatment is less generous (a tax is imposed on real
asset returns to pension funds above a certain level). In Germany and
Japan, tax incentives to "booking" of corporate pension liabilities and
some tax disadvantages to pension funds have, at least until recently,
accompanied smaller funded plans.
Compulsion is a feature of the Swedish public and the Swiss and Aus-
tralian private national funded systems, all of which are designed in the
light of demographic concerns to provide a sizable proportion of retire-
ment benefits. Coverage is hence extremely high: only in the Nether-
lands do voluntary plans reach similar levels of coverage. Because the
plans are compulsory, the tax regime is less important; in particular, the
Australian fiscal treatment of taxation ofcontributions, returns, and ben-
efits would be unlikely to encourage voluntary pension provision. The
French supplementary plans are also compulsory, but pay-as-you-go fi-
nancing is enforced.
Funded sectors differ in terms of maturity, which also influences
the current and prospective asset/GDP ratio. In the United States, the
United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and the Netherlands, defined benefit
plans are largely mature and hence the asset/ GOP ratio is near a peak,
although personal and defined contribution funds could spur further
growth in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. In Den-
mark, Japan, and Germany, immaturity of company plans indicates fur-
ther growth is likely. In Australia and Switzerland, the relatively recent
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introduction of mandatory pension funds means that a significant pro-
portion of pension funds will again be immature.
A simple regression analysis was carried out to test the main influences
on the "broad" pension asset/ GOP ratio, using as independent variables
the key factors identified above, namely the scope of social security,
the tax regime, whether the scheme is mandatory, and maturity of the
scheme. Of course, such a regression cannot prove causality. Subject to
this caveat, the equation does indicate the importance of these factors in
discriminating between countries with small and large private funded
sectors. It suggests that everyone percentage point increase in the dif-
ference between social security replacement ratios at US$ 20,000 and
US$ 50,000 is associated with a 1.2 percent higher asset/GOP ratio; a
deviation from favorable "expenditure tax" treatment of pensions is re-
lated to 21 percent lower funding; countries where there is compulsion
have a 23 percent higher ratio, ceteris paribus, and those with mature
systems a 27 percent higher asset/ GOP ratio. All variables were signifi-
cant at the 95 percent level.
Detailed study of national funded sectors (Davis 1994a) suggests that
other important factors in the development of occupational pension
funds are the ability of employees to opt out of earnings-related social
security for an equivalent private pension (as in the United Kingdom and
Japan) , funding of civil service pensions (Netherlands), widening ofcov-
erage via encouragement of personal pensions (United Kingdom, Can-
ada, United States, Switzerland), and encouragement of supplementary
defined contribution plans (United States). On the other hand, devel-
opment can be stopped by simply banning company-based externally
funded plans, as in France (Syatt 1993), and funding of social security in
Sweden ensures private funds remain small.
A striking feature of this analysis of the determinants of private fund-
ing is that it appears to be tenuously related to the underlying fundamen-
tals that were outlined above. This is not surprising, as in most countries
social security and private provision have evolved piecemeal, without
coordination. Only in Australia (and Chile) does social security provide
solely for basic needs. There is little correlation between the wage-inter-
est differential and the size of funded sectors, nor, as yet, to the future
aging of the population in the different countries. These should pre-
dispose countries such as France, Italy, Japan, and Germany to extend
the scope of funding. Retirement system reform has nonetheless been
marked in Japan, with a reduction in social security promises, partial
funding of social security, and reduction of tax benefits to "booking"
(Watanabe, Chapter 4, this volume), but elsewhere it has been slow. l '
Taxation costs and transition problems, as well as preference for the "so-
cial solidarity" of comprehensive pay-as-you-go, are among the reasons.
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What Are the Principal Pension Regulations
Affecting Financing?
A final factor that may influence the size of the funded sector is regula-
tion, by requiring external funding of benefits per se and/or affecting
the attractiveness of provision of funds to companies. This section as-
sesses the main regulations affecting pension fund financing, namely
regulations of funding and portfolio regulations, and considers their
influence, together with other factors, on the portfolio distribution, the
returns, and hence the cost ofproviding a given level of benefits. In terms
of the framework set out in the first section, funding rules can be seen
as ensuring that assets actually are accumulated to cover benefit prom-
ises under funding, while portfolio regulations seek to influence the na-
ture of the return to funding. The basic regulations are summarized in
Table 4.
Regulation of the funding of benefits is a key aspect of the regulatory
framework for defined benefit pension funds. Note that, by definition, a
defined contribution plan is always fully funded, as assets equal liabilities,
whereas as noted with defined benefit plans there is a distinction be-
tween the pension plan (setting out contractual rights to the parties) and
the fund (a pool ofassets to provide collateral for the promised benefits).
When the fund is worth less than the present value of promised benefits,
there is underfunding; when the opposite is the case, there is overfund-
ing. Calculation ofappropriate funding levels requires a number of actu-
arial assumptions, in particular the assumed return on assets, projected
future wage growth (for final salary plans), and projected future inflation
(if there is indexing of pensions), as well as estimates of death rates and
the expected evolution of the relative number of contributors and bene-
ficiaries over time. Minimum funding limits set by regulation seek to
protect security ofbenefits against default risk by the company, given that
unfunded benefits are liabilities on the books of the firm and therefore
risk is concentrated and pensioners (or pension insurers) may have no
better claim in case of bankruptcy than any other creditor. l5 Funding
offers a diversified and hence less risky alternative back-up for the benefit
promise, as well as offering the possibility of unplanned benefit increases
if the plan is in surplus. Extra protection against creditors of a bankrupt
firm is afforded when the pension fund is independent of the firm and
when self-investment is banned or severely restricted, as is the case in
most countries except Germany and Japan. There are usually also upper
limits on funding, to prevent abuse of tax privileges (overfunding). Bodie
(1990) suggests that the three main reasons why firms fund, besides
regulations per se, are because of the tax incentives, in order to provide
financial slack (when there is a surplus) that can be used in case of
TABLE 4 Summary of Pension Asset Regulations
Country
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
Japan
Canada
Netherlands
Sweden
Denmark
Switzerland
Australia
France
Italy
Portfolio R£gulations
Prudent man concept; 10%
self investment limit for de-
fined benefit funds.
Prudent man concept; five
percent self investment
limit, concentration limit
for defined contribution
plans.
Guidelines; maximum 20%
equity, five percent prop-
erty, four percent foreign,
10% selfinvestment limit.
Guidelines; maximum 30%
equity, 20% property, 30%
foreign, 10% in one coun-
try; minimum 50% in
bonds.
Prudent man, tax on foreign
assets over 10%, seven per-
cent limit on property.
Prudent man concept, five
percent self investment
limit.
Majority to be in listed bonds,
debentures and retroverse
loans to contributors.
Property, shares and invest-
ment truSt holdings limited
to 40%, foreign assets to
20%; 60% to be in domes-
tic debt. No self investment.
50% limit on domestic shares,
50% on property, 20% for-
eign currency assets.
Prudent man rule.
Assets of supplementary
funds to be invested 50%
in government bonds and
less than 33% in loans to
sponsors.
No pension law.
R£gulation ofFuruiingl
ABO must be funded. Maxi-
mum 50% overfund of the
ABO. Higher insurance
premiums if underfunded.
Maximum 5% overfund of
PRO or IRO. Funding only
obligatory for contracted
out part of social security.
Funding obligatory up to
PRO. Option of book-
reserve funding.
Tax exempt up to ABO only.
Option of book-reserve
funding.
Maximum 5% overfund of
PRO. Funding obligatory.
Funding obligatory for IRO
or PRO.
IRO is funded. Contribution
rate adjusted 5-yearly to bal-
ancefund.
Irrelevant as defined contri-
bution; benefits must be
funded externally.
Funding only obligatory for
ABO; PBO usually funded.
Four percent to be credited
to accounts annually.
Irrelevant as defined contri-
bution; minimum contribu-
tion rate enforced.
Funded company schemes
forbidden; book reserve
funding subject to tax dis-
crimination.
No pension law.
Source: Davis (1994a).
Note: I ABO refers to the accrued benefit obligation; PBO to the projected benefit obligation.
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financial difficulty, and because pension benefit insurance may not cover
the highest-paid employees.
Certain definitions are useful as background to a discussion offunding
rules. The "windup" definition ofliabilities, the "solvency" level at which
the firm can meet all its current obligations absent any projections of
salary, is known as the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO).16 The
assumption that rights will continue to accrue, and be indexed up to
retirement, as is normal in a final salary plan, gives the projected benefit
obligation (PBO)P The indexed benefit obligation (IBO) assumes in-
dexation after retirement. 18 An important argument in favor of the
PBO IIBO over the ABO is that it ensures advance provision for the bur-
den of maturity of the plan, when there are many pensioners and fewer
workers, by spreading costs over the life of the plan (Frijns and Petersen
1992). This may be better for the financial stability of the sponsor. 19
In the United States the ABO must be funded; unfunded plans are
. forbidden in theory, though in practice some forms are less fully funded.
Together \vith absence of obligatory indexation, this has an important
influence on portfolio distributions, since underfunding (shortfall risk)
can be avoided, and tax benefits to the firm maximized, by holding
bonds, or at least by portfolio insurance strategies; unhedged equities are
only suitable for overfunded plans. The United States Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) guarantees (up to a limit) benefits of
defined benefit funds in default, funded by contributions from all de-
fined benefit plans; the funding requirement can be seen partly as a
protection for PBGC. Higher PBGC insurance premiums are charged to
underfunded plans.
The United States illustrates the interaction of funding rules with
accounting standards and tax law in influencing funding. Under the
United States accounting standard FASB 87, if pension assets fall below
the ABO, the unfunded liability must be reported in the firm's balance
sheet, and since they are senior debt, they act as a major problem for the
firm in raising funds. However, a surplus cannot be included on the
balance sheet, although it can be implicitly recouped by reducing in
contributions, as discussed below. The accounting standard requires pre-
sentation of the PBO, as well as the ABO, thus ensuring at least partial
focus on future liabilities. Again, overfunding in the United States has
since 1987 been limited by tax law to ISO percent of the ABO. This
implies that a rise in interest rates could prevent funher funding, leaving
the plan underfunded when interest rates fall. This would not have been
the case for a PBO definition, taking projected rises in benefits into
account, as long as the Fisher effect holds, that is, interest rates rise with
expected inflation.
Other countries show similar interactions. In Germany, various laws or
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court decisions have enforced minimum standards of funding for pen-
sion funds (while leaving open the choice ofa book reserve system) and
what amounts to inflation indexing of pensions. These provisions were
felt to be particularly burdensome, and have helped blunt the growth
rate of externally funded private pension plans as opposed to "booked"
benefits (Deutsche Bundesbank 1984). In both Germany and Switzer-
land, accounting conventions have an impact on funding decisions, as
shortfalls (defined at the lower of cost and market value of assets) are
included in the company accounts (Hepp 1992). It is suggested that this
helps to account for conservative investment strategies, independently of
portfolio regulations discussed below. Rules forcing employers in Switzer-
land to credit at least 4 percent to pension accounts annually may have a
similar effect. In Japan, the traditional means of providing retirement
benefits was via booked benefits, with a special reserve account on the
balance sheet as benefits accrue. Externally funded plans must be funded
only up to the ABO, and there is reportedly very little overfunding, partly
because contributions that would raise funding levels above the ABO are
taxed. In Canada plans must be funded as going concerns, including
projections of salary rises (i.e., the PBO); unfunded plans are forbidden,
and any unfunded liabilities must be paid offin 15 years.
In the United Kingdom, plans that contract out of earnings-related
social security must fund sufficiently to provide an equivalent "guar-
anteed minimum pension" (GMP), but this is far below actual benefit
promises. Funding above this level is not legally required - although
trustees are bound by their duty of care to ensure funding is in place-
nor is there a requirement to include deficits in company balance sheets.
In practice a continuance basis such as the PBO or 180 tends to be used,
on which overfunding is limited to 5 percent. A crucial difference from
other countries is that adequacy of funding is judged by current and
projected cash flows from assets and not current market values; this al-
lows volatile assets such as equities to be heavily used. This is reflected in
accounting standard SSAP24, which also bases fund valuation on such
actuarial valuations and long-run smoothing. Historically, this has not
conflicted with the need to cover obligations if the fund is wound up,
since the PBO has tended to exceed the ABO. But compulsory indexa-
tion, currently being introduced, will increase the ABO and could put
the system under threat (Riley 1993) .20 Meanwhile, although the govern-
ment guarantees to pay the GMP if a plan fails, there has to date been no
system to guarantee non-GMP pension benefits in the United Kingdom;
partly for this reason regulations have historically been less strict than
elsewhere, and managers could adopt a high return/high risk portfolio
strategy. However, the Goode Committee on United Kingdom pension
law - set up to report on regulatory shortcomings in the wake of the
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Maxwell scandal, and which reported in 1993 - recommended a mini-
mum funding rule based on the ABO, with only a three-month grace
period to top up the fund, albeit with a 10 percent shortfall being permit-
ted without the immediate need to top up. Insurance against fraud was
also recommended. The government launched a bill in mid-1994 approv-
ing these proposals, although funding rules will be less strict for im-
mature funds. This raises issues similar to those outlined above for the
United States, and might alter quite significantly the asset mix of United
Kingdom funds toward less volatile but also less profitable assets.
The importance of the choice of discount rate in funding calculations
is shown by a 1993 United States Department ofLabor estimate that a one
percent fall in the bond yield would raise pension liabilities by 10 percent
for the average fund. 21 Feldstein and Morck (1983) report that many
underfunded plans in the United States tended to use a high rate to
discount fund liabilities. One answer to these problems is to take a long-
run view of asset returns, or possibly, where inflation is low and stable, a
fixed benchmark discount rate. The latter is the case in the Netherlands,
where funding of the PBO is compulsory and the government sets a
maximum real interest rate assumption of4 percent, as well as an assump-
tion for wage growth. Since in practice Dutch funds have been able to
earn over this level, surpluses estimated at 30 percent were present by
1990; a special tax levy is planned. In the United States, in the light of
the tendencies noted above, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has insisted that interest rate assumptions follow actual bond
yields closely. InJapan contributions are set assuming a 5 percent nomi-
nal rate of return on fund assets. In Canada a nominal return of 8.5
percent and 5.75 percent wage growth are standard assumptions. In the
United Kingdom the government accepts the (varying) judgment of the
actuaries, and generally also allows for an assumption of wage growth.
Finally, since most Danish and Australian funds (as well as a proportion
of funds in Switzerland and the Anglo-American countries) are defined
contribution plans, the issue of funding does not arise. However, the
issue of limiting tax privilege does arise, and is dealt with (in Australia)
via contribution limits and (in both countries) via taxation of returns.
Quantitative regulation of portfolio distributions is imposed in a num-
ber of countries, with the ostensible aim of protecting pension fund
beneficiaries, or benefit insurers, although motives such as ensuring a
steady demand for government bonds may also playa part. Limits are
often imposed on holdings of assets with relatively volatile returns, such
as equities and property, as well as foreign assets, even if their mean
return is relatively high. There are also often limits on self-investment,
to protect against the associated concentration of risk regarding insol-
vency of the sponsor.22 Apart from the control of self-investment, which is
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clearly necessary to ensure that funds are not vulnerable to banJu-uptcy of
the sponsor, the degree to which such regulations actually contribute to
benefit security is open to doubt, since pension funds, unlike insurance
companies, may face the risk of increasing liabilities as well as the risk of
holding assets, and hence need to trade volatility with return. Mmeover,
appmpriate diversification of assets can eliminate any idiosyncratic risk
from holding an individual security m type of asset, thus minimizing the
increase in risk. Again, if national cycles and markets are imperfectly
couelated, international investment will reduce otherwise undiversifia-
ble or "systematic" risk (see Davis 1994b and Table 9 below). Pmtfolio
limits may be particularly inappmpriate fm defined benefit pensions,
given the additional "buffer" of the company guarantee and risk shar-
ing between older and young workers, and if benefits must be indexed.
Clearly, in such cases, portfolio regulations may affect the attractiveness
to companies of pmviding pension funds, if it constrains managers in
their choice of risk and return, fmcing them to hold low-yielding assets
and possibly increasing their risks by limiting their possibilities fm diversi-
fication. 2' It will also restrict the benefits to the capital markets from the
development of pension funds; in particular, in the case of restrictions
that explicitly m implicitly oblige pension funds to invest in government
bonds, which must themselves be repaid fmm taxation, there may be no
benefit to capital fmmation and the "funded" plans may at a macmeco-
nomic level be virtually equivalent to pay-as-you-go.24
Japanese funds face ceilings on holdings of certain assets such as 30
percent for foreign assets and fm equities, which Matsuhim Tamma
(1992) suggests (inappmpriately) "imitate regulations devised for tmst
banking and life insurers." German pension funds, besides a 10 percent
self investment limit, remain subject to the same panoply ofregulation as
life insurers (4 percent limit on foreign asset holdings, 20 percent limit
on equities, 5 percent on pmperty). It is arguable that these are par-
ticularly inappmpriate fm German pension funds given the indexed na-
tme of their liabilities.25 Note that by offering tax privileges to "booking,"
Germany and Japan effectively impose no limits on self-investment of
book reserves (although the Germans do insist on insurance of such
reserves). Swiss limits are similarly structmed, but since the end of 1992
have been much less restrictive than the Germans': a 50 percent limit on
shares, 50 percent for real estate, and 30 percent on fmeign assets (Meier
1993). Scandinavian limits are in many ways even tighter than the Ger-
mans', in that minima are also specified. The Swedish ATP, as well as
private funds, have historically been obliged to hold the majority of its
assets in domestic listed bonds, debentures, and retroverse loans to con-
tributors (although recent deregulations have permitted limited invest-
ment in pmperty, equities, and fmeign assets, of which some private
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plans have reportedly taken advantage). Historically, restrictions on eq-
uity investments were justified on the additional ground that for ATP
they would involve backdoor nationalization and worker control. Danish
funds have to hold 60 percent in domestic debt instruments, although
since 1990 they have been allowed to hold 20 percent in foreign assets.
Investment in the sponsor is forbidden. Mutual societies providing pen-
sions in France (via group insurance policies) must follow insurance
regulations that insist that they invest at least 34 percent in state bonds,
and a maximum of 40 percent in property and 5 percent in shares of
foreign insurers.
Such limits are not, however, imposed in all the countries studied. For
example, pension funds in the United States are subject to a "prudent
man rule" that requires managers to diversify portfolios; the primary
limit to portfolio distributions is a 10 percent limit on self investment for
defined benefit funds and some defined contribution funds. 26 United
Kingdom pension funds are subject to trust law and implicitly follow the
"prudent man" concept; as long as trust deeds are appropriately struc-
tured they are not constrained by regulation in their portfolio distribu-
tion except forlimits on self-investment (5 percent) and concentration.27
Australian funds' investment has been unrestricted since exchange con-
trols were abolished in 1983 and public sector funds were deregulated in
1985, except for a 10 percent limit on exposure to the sponsor. Dutch
private funds face no legal restrictions, except for a 5 percent limit on
self-investment (Van Loo 1988). In contrast, the Dutch public service
fund (ABP) faces strict limits, being able to invest only 10 percent abroad
and 20 percent in shares or real estate. Some countries have switched to
"prudent man" rules; Canadian funds were strictly regulated until 1987
(when the "prudent man" concept was introduced) and have until re-
cently faced limits on the share ofexternal assets.
To conclude, funding and portfolio regulations differ quite signifi-
cantly, with some countries using only accrued benefit-based funding
and others projected benefits. The division for portfolio regulations,
between countries with "prudent man" rules and regulations, is even
more stark. In the next sections we probe the consequences of such rules
for portfolios.
How Are Pension Assets Invested?
The portfolio distribution and the corresponding return and risk on the
assets held are the key determinant of the cost to the company of provid-
ing a pension in a defined benefit plan and the replacement ratio obtain-
able via a defined contribution fund (and hence in each case the yield
that can be obtained by funding relative to that of pay-as-you-go). This
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section seeks to trace the various influences on portfolio distributions, in
particular those of the portfolio and funding regulations outlined above.
How might funds be invested in the absence of portfolio regulation? As
shown by Black (1980), for both defined benefit and defined contribu-
tion funds, there is an incentive to maximize the tax advantage of pen-
sion funds by investing in assets with the highest possible spread between
pre-tax and post-tax returns. In 1980 in the United States this was bonds,
but some analysts suggest that since 1986 the relative tax advantage of
equities has declined sharply, making them candidates for pension fund
investment on this basis (Chen and Reichenstein 1993) .28 Apart from this
a defined contribution pension plan would seek to diversify, seeking to
maximize return for a given risk, and shift to lower risk assets for older
workers as they approach retirement.
More complex considerations arise for defined benefit funds. First,
there is an incentive to overfund to maximize the tax benefits, as well as
to provide a larger contingency fund, which as noted is usually coun-
teracted by government-imposed limits on funding. Meanwhile, appro-
priate investment strategies will also depend on the nature of the obliga-
tion incurred. If it is the ABO and is purely nominal, with penalties for
shortfalls, it will be appropriate in theory to match (or "immunize") the
liabilities with bonds of the same duration to hedge the interest rate risk
of these liabilities, or at least to hedge against the risk of shortfall when
holding more volatile securities. With a projected benefit obligation tar-
get, an investment policy based on diversification may be most appropri-
ate, in the belief that risk reduction depends on a maximum diversifica-
tion of the pension fund relative to the firm's operating investments
(Ambachtsheer 1988).29 Moreover, if the projected liability includes an
element of indexation, then fund managers and actuaries typically as-
sume that it may be appropriate to include a proportion of equities and
property in the portfolio as well as bonds (Christopher Daykin, this vol-
ume). This should minimize the risk of longer-term shortfall of assets
relative to liabilities, implicitly diversifYing between investment risk and
liability risk (which are largely risks of inflation) .30
An essential counterpart to such an approach is that regulators allow
gradual amortization of shortfalls, or even focus in solvency calculations
on income from assets rather than market values as in the United King-
dom. Allowing inflation indexation of pension to be discretionary, as is
the case in most countries other than the United Kingdom and Germany,
is another way to reduce the risk of shortfall; implicitly it is a form of risk
sharing between firm and workers. Maturity will also affect optimal port-
folios. For example Blake (1994) suggests that given the varying duration
of liabilities it is rational for immature defined benefit funds having
"real" liabilities to invest mainly in equities (long duration), for mature
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funds to invest in a mix of equities and bonds, and for funds that are
winding up mainly in bonds (short duration).
It is important to note that many financial economists disagree with
the implicit assumptions that may underlie a strategy of equity invest-
ment, namely that equity is a hedge against inflation, and that raising the
share of equity reduces costs, as opposed to merely raising expected
returns, and offering benefits of diversification (Bodie 1990). We do not
seek to take sides in this debate in this chapter. Suffice to note here that
Tepper (1992) suggests that the debate hinges on whether returns on
equity are statistically independent from year to year.lfthey are, it is quite
conceivable that a long series of bad returns could lead to significant real
losses from equities even over a long time horizon relevant to pension
funds. But proponents of the view that equities outperform bonds over
long time horizons would maintain that there are reversals in trends in
returns to ensure that owners of capital are compensated over the long
term. They suggest that although underperformance of equities is quite
common in the short term, long-term underperformance would entail
economic collapse, which governments would seek to resist. Also ofinter-
est in this context is the suggestion that the premium in returns of equi.
ties over bonds is more than can be explained by relative risk (Mehra and
Prescott 1985), which if correct implies that risk-neutral investors such as
pension funds can gain from holding equities.
The actual patterns of portfolio distributions over the past two decades
are shown in Table 5. Marked differences emerge: for example, in 1990
equity holdings varied from one percent in Sweden to 63 percent in the
United Kingdom, and foreign assets from one percent in Denmark to 18
percent in the United Kingdom. As background, estimates of real total
returns and their standard deviations for 1967 to 1990 are shown in Table
6. Davis (1994a) offers a detailed analysis of these patterns of portfolio
distributions and their determinants. So here I offer an overview of cer-
tain key determinants, grouping by type of influence.
In line with the discussion above, liabilities are a major influence, for
example affecting the share of bonds. In countries such as Canada, with a
high share of bonds, only nominal returns have historically been prom-
ised after retirement, while in the United Kingdom, where bond holding
is low, a degree of inflation protection both before and after retirement is
expected. Similar indexation promises are made by the Swedish supple-
mentary national plan, despite which the bond share is extremely high,
suggesting an inefficient portfolio allocation.
Historically the higher taxation on bonds than on equities made the
former an attractive investment to tax-exempt investors such as pension
funds, but as noted recent analyses suggest that equities are now less
advantaged in the United States, and hence should be more attractive,
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TABLE 5 Pension Fund Portfolio Distributions (percentage)
Loans Liquidity OfWhich
and and Foreign
Country Equitie5 Bonds Mortgages Property Deposits Assets'
United 1970 49 32 0 10 4 2
Kingdom 1980 52 24 0 18 5 9
1990 63 14 0 9 7 18
United 1970 45 45 6 0 I 0
States 1980 41 41 2 0 8 I
1990 46 36 2 0 9 4
Germany 1970 4 19 50 12 3 0
1980 9 24 52 9 2 0
1990 18 25 45 6 2 I
Japan 1970 6 12 52 27 2 0
1980 9 51 33 6 2 I
1990 27 47 14 2 3 7
Canada 1970 27 53 II I 5 0
1980 26 50 12 2 9 4
1990 33 47 4 3 II 6
Netherlands 1970 11 15 54 16 3 7
1980 5 10 69 14 2 4
1990 20 23 43 II 3 15
Sweden 1970 0 76 22 0 I 0
1980 0 74 26 0 I 0
1990 I 84 10 I 3 0
Switzerland 1970 3 25 48 16 7 0
1980 9 28 37 18 6 0
1990 16 29 22 17 12 3
Denmark 1970 0 72 7 0 3 0
1980 3 63 7 0 2 0
1990 7 67 7 0 I I
Australia 1970 15 51 0 2 nla 0
1980 15 33 0 13 nla 0
1990 27 20 0 16 23 13
Source: National flow-of·funds data.
Note: 'Foreign assets are included in the categories (0 the left.
and indeed bond shares in the United States have declined somewhat.
Often portfolio regulations force funds to hold tax-disadvantaged assets,
as in Denmark, where funds must hold 60 percent fixed interest assets,
despite the real interest tax on such assets.
Asset returns, both absolute and relative to other assets, are a key in-
fluence on the structure ofany portfolio. This is confirmed byeconomet-
ric analysis of the portfolio distributions of pension funds, which shows
they are strongly influenced by relative asset returns, particularly where
there are few regulations governing portfolio distributions and low trans-
actions costs, as in the United Kingdom and the United States (Davis
TABLE 6 Returns on Pension Fund Portfolios, 1967-90: Mean (and Standard Deviation) ofAnnual Real Total Returns
(percentage, domestic currency)
United
United States Kingdom Germany Japan Canada Netherlands Sweden Denmark
Estimated portfolio
return I 2.2 (11.9) 5.8 (12.5) 5.1 (4.4) 4.0 (9.4) 1.6 (9.8) 4.0 (6.0) 0.2 (7.6) 3.6 (12.0)
Average earnings
growth 0.2 (2.1 ) 2.6 (2.5) 4.0 (3.1 ) 4.2 (4.2) 1.7 (2.8) 2.4 (3.2) 1.5 (3.5) 2.8 (3.0)
Portfolio return less
average earnings 2.0 3.2 l.l -0.2 -0.1 1.6 -1.3 0.8
Inflation (CP1) 5.8 (3.0) 8.9 (5.3) 3.5 (2.1 ) 5.5 (5.3) 6.4 (3.0) 4.9 (3.1) 8.1 (2.7) 7.7 (3.0)
Retumson
Loans 3.5 (2.9) 1.4 (5.0) 5.3 (1.9) 0.9 (4.3) 4.0 (3.7) 3.8 (3.6) 3.4 (3.1 ) 6.1 (3.0)
Mortgages 2.0 (13.4) 2.0 (5.2) 4.7 (1.4) 3.0 (4.9) 2.4 (12.3) 4.3 (2.6) 2.6 (3.0) 5.8 (3.0)
Equities 4.7 (14.4) 8.1 (20.3) 9.5 (20.3) 10.9 (19.4) 4.5 (16.5) 7.9 (28.2) 8.4 (23.3) 7.0 (27.0)
Bonds -0.5 (14.3) -0.5 (13.0) 2.7 (14.9) 0.2 (12.8) 0.0 (12.1) 1.0 (13.1) -0.9 (8.5) 3.4 (16.0)
Short-term assets 2.0 (2.5) 1.7 (4.9) 3.1 (2.1) -0.5 (4.6) 2.5 (3.3) 1.6 (4.0) 1.3 (3.5) 1.6 (1.0)
Property 3.4 (6.4) 6.7 (11.4) 4.5 (2.9) 7.2 (6.8) 4.6 (6.2) 4.6 (15.0) nla nla nla nla
Foreign bonds 1.6 (14.9) -0.1 (15.0) 3.0 (11.2) 1.3 (14.6) -1.7 (12.7) -0.7 (11.2) -0.2 (12.6) -2.0 (11.0)
Foreign equities 9.9 (17.2) 7.0 (16.2) 10.4 (13.5) 7.8 (18.7) 5.8 (14.3) 6.6 (14.4) 7.1 (14.0) 5.5 (14.0)
Memo: portfolio
return' 3.9 (7.6) 6.3 (10.7) 5.5 (3.0) 2.9 (5.7) 4.1 (5.0) 4.3 (5.5) 2.8 (2.9) 5.8 (3.0)
Source: Davis (1994a), using national flow offunds data (for portfolio distribution see Table 5) and BIS macroeconomic database (for asset returns).
Notes: I Using holding period returns on bonds (all countries) and on fixed-rate mortgages (United States and Canada).
2Using redemption yields on fixed rate instrumenls.
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1988). Adjustment to a change in such returns is generally rapid. As-
suming adequate information and appropriate incentives to fund man-
agers, this should imply an efficient allocation of funds and correct valua-
tion of securities. In my research, these results did not all hold where
transactions costs are high and regulations are strict, as in Germany,
Japan, and Canada. In these countries adjustment to a change in returns
is somewhat slower and allocation of funds less efficient. The results also
contrast with those for households and companies, where adjustment to
changes in returns tends to be slow, due to higher transactions costs and
poorer information. Examples in Table 6 of responses to relative returns
include the high levels of liquidity held temporarily after stock market
collapses in the United Kingdom in the mid-1970s, and in the longer
term due to structural changes in yields arising from deregulation and
expansion of short-term markets in the United States and Canada. Inter-
country differences in bond holding may also relate to asset returns;
partly owing to low and stable inflation, real returns on bonds and other
fixed interest assets are relatively high in Germany, Denmark, and the
Netherlands, thus motivating a high portfolio share. But in Sweden and
Switzerland, bonds have a high portfolio share due to portfolio regula-
tions despite poor returns.
Risk reduction is the main motivation for portfolio diversification, as
well as being required by "prudent man" rules. For example, the fall in
the United Kingdom bond share since 1980 partly reflects alternative
means of diversification; after abolition of exchange controls United
Kingdom funds sold bonds to buy foreign assets (although the contrac-
tion in the supply of public debt in the late 1980s also played a role).
Portfolio regulations may operate contrary to this; Swedish and Danish
funds have considerable exposure to housing markets via mortgage-
related bonds and loans to housing credit institutions. Together with
mortgages, these amounted to no less than 57 percent of Swedish funds'
assets in 1990, while Danish funds had 63 percent of assets in mortgages
or mortgage association bonds. These imply an enormous exposure to
potential effects of recession and falling house prices. Meanwhile, as
discussed below, the United Kingdom funds may have portfolios exces-
sively concentrated on equities.
As noted, international diversification can offer to fund managers a
better trade-off of risk to return by reducing the systematic risk of invest-
ing in domestic markets arising from the cycle or medium-term shifts in
the profit share. In the longer term, international investment in coun-
tries with a relatively young population may be essential to prevent battles
over resources between workers and pensioners in countries with an
aging population (Davis 1994b). Table 6 shows that foreign asset hold-
ings have grown sharply over the 1980s in the United Kingdom, Australia,
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and Japan. In all three countries, this pattern followed abolition of ex-
change controls, at a time particularly in the United Kingdom andJapan
when the economies were generating current account surpluses and
overseas investment returns looked attractive. InJapan, portfolio restric-
tions on overseas investment were also progressively eased over the 1980s.
Meanwhile Dutch funds have long held a significant proportion of assets
abroad, partly due to the large volume of pension fund assets compared
with domestic security and real estate markets. Growth has been much
less marked in the other countries; in Germany, Switzerland, Denmark,
Sweden, and Canada this is partly due to portfolio restrictions.
Risk aversion of trustees or managers may limit portfolio distributions,
and at times appears directly counterproductive. In the Netherlands eq-
uity holding remains low - 20 percent - despite absence of portfolio re-
strictions. Van Loo (1988) suggests that this may relate to risk aversion of
pension fund trustees.31 Partly reflecting portfolio regulations, although
probably also due to conservatism of managers (since the limits do not
currently bind) the equity share in countries such as Sweden and Den-
mark is exceptionally low, despite the Danish tax on real returns to debt
instruments, which encourages substitution of equities for bonds. Risk
aversion may also playa role in many countries in limiting international
investment, whereas it actually reduces risk over a time horizon relevant
for pension funds. Risk aversion appears particularly marked for defined
contribution funds; this is partly rational, given the lack of risk sharing
and because workers nearing retirement will be anxious for low risk assets
to be held.32 But this risk aversion may be excessive. Indeed, evidence
from the United States suggests that when employees have control over
investment, as is often the case for defined contribution funds, the vast
majority goes into fixed interest bonds; when equities are held and their
value declines, dissatisfaction is often expressed (Rappaport 1992). Even
for defined benefit funds, pressures to hold low risk assets may be sizable
with an aging membership and employee trustees. But such pressures
also seem to occur when the fund is composed of younger workers. 33
Again, for personal pensions, there is anecdotal evidence in the United
Kingdom that persons free to choose their asset backing often select
highly cautious combinations of assets. In the United States only 25 per-
cent of 401 (k) plan assets are invested in equity, where individuals are free
to choose their portfolio allocations (Frijns and Petersen 1992). Mitchell
(1994) expresses concern that, because of conservative approaches to
investment, future retirees may find their pensions inadequate.
Portfolio regulations have a clear and widespread influence on port-
folios, a number of which have already been mentioned. Bonds con-
stitute over two-thirds of pension fund assets in Sweden and Denmark,
largely because of portfolio regulations and the nature of the domestic
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financial markets, which require that 60 percent of Danish assets be
invested in domestic debt instruments, while the majority of Swedish
assets be in listed bonds, debentures, and retroverse loans. The fact that a
fifth of the Swedish quasi-public funds' assets are invested in government
bonds casts some doubt on their efficacy as a means to protect against
future risks to social security, given the bonds are to be repaid by the
taxpayer in the same way as they would if they were to be used to finance
future social security burdens via pay-as-you-go. Similar comments can be
made about the Dutch civil servants' pension fund (ABP) , which is sub-
ject to such severe portfolio restrictions that at the end of 1991 it held 48
percent of its assets in the form of public sector bonds and loans. The
decline in public bond holding in Australia parallels the removal of port-
folio requirements that formerly required the majority of assets to be
held in government securities. As regards equities, it was noted above
that in Germany funds are limited to a maximum of20 percent by regula-
tion and in Japan to 30 percent; hence at 18 percent and 27 percent
respectively in 1990 the German andJapanese ceilings were almost bind-
ing. Unlike other sectors, which have decreased holdings of property in
recent years, Swiss funds retain around a fifth of their assets in property;
one of the few assets that were relatively under their pre-1993 portfolio
restrictions. This focus may drive up the price ofland, it does not contrib-
ute to capital formation, and funds may face decreasing returns on (do-
mestic) property in the future, as the population declines.
Funding rules also have an effect. In the United States, where mini-
mum funding regulations make it optimal to hold a large proportion of
bonds to protect against shortfall risk, despite their weakness as an infla-
tion hedge, bonds form around 40 percent of pension funds' portfolios.
Bodie (1991) suggests that given such funding rules, it is a paradox that
United States defined benefit funds invest in equities, since a drop in
market values can cause underfunding which has to be reflected in the
employer's profit and loss account. He suggests investment in equities
occurs because management sees a plan as a trust for employees, and
manages assets as if it were a defined contribution plan (i.e., for em-
ployee welfare), with a guaranteed floor given by the benefit formula.
Swiss bonds offer low returns, but given the low target yield of 4 percent
nominal, fund managers there historically saw little need to diversifY into
riskier assets.
As regards accounting standards, in Japan, assets are held at book
value, and a fixed return on the fund (based on interest and capital
gains) is targeted for every year. This gives perverse incentives to sell well-
performing equities as general share prices fall and retain those showing
price declines, as well as to hold more bonds than portfolio optimization
would imply (Tamura 1992). In Germany and Switzerland, Hepp (1990,
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1992) suggests, application of strict accounting principles, which are
more appropriate to banks than to pension funds, restrains equity hold-
ings by funded plans independently of the portfolio regulations in Swit-
zerland, evidenced by the fact that funds' equity holdings are far below
the ceilings permitted. These conventions, for example, insist on positive
net worth of the fund at all times, carry equities on the balance sheet at
the lower of book value and market value, and calculate returns net of
unrealized capital gains. In contrast, the United Kingdom accounting
standard permits long-run smoothing and focuses on dividends rather
than market values, and hence enables funds to accept the volatility of
equity returns. The concern of some commentators in the United King-
dom is rather whether equity holdings are too high given the risks; how-
ever, note that 18 percent of the 63 percent equity share in 1990 was
actually in foreign equities, thus reducing risk somewhat. In 1992 the
equity share was 80 percent, of which 58 percent were domestic and 22
percent foreign. No other country has anything comparable to this port-
folio share of equities. And as noted, new legal proposals may lead funds
to reduce their equity shares.
The structure of fund management in countries such asJapan has had
counterproductive effects, according to some commentators. There the
share of loans has fallen sharply, although these medium-term floating-
rate yen loans to firms were consistently the most profitable investment in
Japan in the 1970s. It can be argued that this highlights a general point,
that protection of fund managers from external competition (as was the
case inJapan until recently) may lead to a suboptimal investment strategy
from the point of view of plan beneficiaries.
Finally there is administrative fiat. Much of the past growth ofJapan-
ese funds' bond holdings may reflect the high share of public bonds
purchased under government pressure, a practice that has now been
abandoned.
Fund Performance
It is evident from the discussion above that a wide variety of often extra-
neous influences impinge on pension fund portfolios, which may in turn
restrict funds from portfolio optimization, reduce return, and raise risk
relative to feasible alternative investment strategies. We suggest that a
useful means ofjudging the cost of these regulations and market imper-
fections, as well as of devising appropriate contribution rates, is to assess
pension fund performance relative both to that in other countries and to
that of artificial portfolios. The patterns of portfolio distributions (Table
5) and risks and returns on assets can be used to derive estimates of the
returns and risks on portfolios (Table 6), and hence the cost to the firm
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ofproviding a given level of pension benefits (for a defined benefit fund)
or the return to the member (for a defined contribution fund)." The
estimates suggest that over the period 1967 to 1990, pension funds in
the United Kingdom obtained the highest real return, those in Swe-
den, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States the lowest.35 The result
of course partly reflects risk and the share of equity and property, the
United Kingdom having the highest standard deviation of returns (to-
gether with Denmark), and by far the highest share of real assets. Mean-
while, Swedish, Swiss, U.S., and Canadian funds held high proportions of
bonds, which performed poorly over this period. Note that U.S. funds are
also high risk in real terms despite relatively conservative portfolios; this
is mainly due to unanticipated inflation in the 1970s, but it may also
relate to funding rules and tax incentives. Interestingly, portfolios in
Germany and the Netherlands had a high real return and low volatility,
despite their focus on bonds and loans. This relates to relatively high
returns on fixed-rate instruments in those countries. However, as dis-
cussed below, Table 9 shows that real returns for German and Dutch
funds could have been boosted significantly by an increased share of
equities. Investment in international equities would ensure that the asso-
ciated increase in risk was mitigated.
Several observations can be made regarding these results. The publicly
sponsored Swedish fund does poorly. The low-return Swedish and Swiss
(and latterly the Australian system) are also compulsory, thus in principle
reducing competitive pressures. In the case of Australian and Danish
funds, occupational defined contribution funds imply that those who
select the managers (companies themselves) do not bear the high level of
portfolio risk. TheJapanese, Swiss, and Germans have generally had little
competition in fund management (Davis 1994a), and suffer from inap-
propriate accounting standards. But as shown by the results for Germany,
good economic performance (or international diversification) can over-
come a number of handicaps. Comparison of the results with (nomi-
nally) risk-free yields suggests that the funds generally outperformed
government bonds, albeit only narrowly in Denmark (Table 6). However,
in Canada and Sweden the portfolio return is below that on market paper
(it is open to doubt whether the markets were deep enough to absorb
pension funds' size, of course). Returns are generally below those on
equities, but at a benefit of much lower risk.
The most crucial test is the ability ofa fund to outperform real average
earnings, given that liabilities of defined benefit plans are basically inde-
xed to them. Similarly the replacement ratio a defined contribution fund
can offer will depend on asset returns relative to earnings growth. Follow-
ing the discussion in the first section, it also indicates whether in practice
the return to funding (the asset return) exceeds that on pay-as-you-go in
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TABLE 7 Local Government and Private Pension Fund Returns (1967-90'):
Mean (and Standard Deviation) of Annual Real Total Returns
(domestic currency)
Country
United Kingdom
Local authority funds
Private funds
United States
State and local funds
Private funds
Source: Davis (I994a) .
Note: '1967-1988 for the United Kingdom.
Mean
4.9
5.6
1.2
2.7
Std. Dev.
(13.4)
(13.0)
(12.6)
(11.7)
a steady state (the growth rate ofaverage earnings). The margin is sizable
(over 2 percent per year) in the United States and United Kingdom, and
between one percent and 2 percent in Germany and the Netherlands.
Except for Germany, all these countries have "prudent man" rules. The
margin remains positive in Denmark and (barely) in Australia. But in
Sweden,Japan, Canada, and Switzerland, it is actually negative, implying
that the returns on assets need to be constantly topped up to meet their
target. It was noted above that this may relate to inefficient asset alloca-
tions, often arising from portfolio restrictions. Taking the results at face
value, and disregarding demographic issues, pay-as-you-go would have
offered a higher rate of return than funding over this time period in
these countries.
Risk, measured crudely as the standard deviation of the annual real
return, should not be disregarded; as noted, it is quite high in a number
ofcountries. But defined benefit pension funds are well placed to accept
a degree of volatility, as there can be risk sharing between worker and
company as well as between younger and older members. Risk is more
important for defined contribution funds as there is no back-up from the
sponsor and pensions must typically be taken in a lump sum (to buy an
annuity) at the precise point of retirement. In contrast, annuities from
defined benefit funds typically come from the fund itself, or at least the
rate is guaranteed. In the light of this, the high levels of risk in Denmark
and Australia, where funds are mainly defined contribution, are of po-
tential concern.36
The data for the United Kingdom and United States allow a further
comparison of effects of ownership and management methods to be
made, this time in the same markets, in that portfolios of public (local
government) fund data can be identified separately from those of private
sector funds. Estimates of the respective returns are shown in Table 7. In
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TABLE 8 Targeted Replacement Rates with Indexed Pensions (percent)
Replacement Ratio Percentage Replacement Ratio
Assuming Contribution Assuming
Indexation of Ratefar 40 % Indexation of
Country Pensions to Prices Replacement Rate Pensions to Wa~
United States 37 10.8 37
United Kingdom 60 6.7 50
Germany 39 10.3 27
Japan 29 13.8 20
Canada 25 16.0 20
Netherlands 44 9.1 37
Sweden 14 28.6 II
Switzerland 25 16.0 20
Denmark 36 11.1 27
Australia 30 13.3 27
Source: Vitlas (1992) and estimates of average earnings. inflation, and real returns on
pension funds shown in Table 9.
each case, local government funds obtain lower returns than private
funds. This can be related to more conservative portfolio distributions
and in some cases portfolio regulations. United Kingdom local authority
funds held an average of52 percent equity over the sample, while private
funds held 56 percent. For United States funds the difference is more
dramatic: 25 percent and 53 percent, according to the Federal Reserve
flow-of-funds data. Interestingly, the risks in real terms were higher for
the local government funds, pardy as a consequence of the volatility of
real returns on bonds (Table 6). In this context, Mitchell (1994) analyzed
returns and funding ratios on a sample of United States state and local
government pension funds and found, consistent with the discussion of
risk aversion and of portfolio regulations above, that both returns and
funding were lower when retirees and employees were on the board, and
when "social investment" was required (i.e., a proportion of the portfolio
invested in local companies) .
In order to estimate the benefits/contributions trade-off, Table 8
shows the results of illustrative calculations on the relation between costs
of providing pensions, average earnings, and real returns (Vittas 1992).
The table shows the replacement rate that would be attainable given the
real returns attained by funds in each country and the corresponding
growth rates of wages shown in Table 6, assuming indexed pensions, a 10
percent "defined" contribution rate, 40 years of contributions, and 20
years of retirement. Abstracting from risk, the table illustrates clearly the
benefits of a higher return relative to real earnings; assuming pensions
are indexed to prices, United Kingdom funds can obtain a replacement
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ratio of 60 percent, Canadians only 25 percent. Conversely, to obtain a
pension equal to 40 percent of average earnings, United Kingdom funds
need a contribution rate of 6. 7 percent, and Swiss funds of 16 percent.
Ofcourse, in practice contribution rates are sometimes higher than 10
percent, implying higher potential benefits; for example the Australian
government mandates a minimum of 12 percent beginning in 2000.
Danish contributions tend to be around 10 to 15 percent, despite there
being no ceiling imposed by taxation. Such ceilings are standard practice
elsewhere, for example, in the United Kingdom, total contributions are
limited to 17.5 percent of the employee's salary, and the maximum em-
ployee contribution is 15 percent of salary. Typically, employees contrib-
ute 5.5 percent and employers the remainder. However, in the United
Kingdom, employers do not contribute on behalf of those opting out of
company plans in favor of personal pensions, which reduces typical con-
tributions to 6 percent. United States employers typically do contribute
to employees' 401 (k) plans, although these have many of the character-
istics of United Kingdom personal pensions. In Sweden, contributions
are 13 percent. In countries such as Germany, where private pension
plans have limited "supplementary" objectives, contributions are typ-
ically much lower, around 3.5 percent ofsalary. InJapan, contributions to
funds remaining in social security (TQPPs) are limited to 3.2 percent of
salary regardless of the condition of the fund. Funds replacing social
security (EPFs) are more flexible, in that contributions are set to obtain
the promised benefit given an assumed nominal return of 5.5 percent.
The distribution ofcontributions between employer and employee varies
widely, although it need not have significant economic implications if
employers reduce salaries to offset their contributions. The proportion
paid by the employer is around 100 percent in Japan and Sweden, 89
percent in Germany, 87 percent in the United States (100 percent for
most private defined benefit funds), 70 to 75 percent in the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands, 66 percent in Denmark, and 58
percent in SwitzerlandY
As a further experiment, Table 9 shows the returns on artificial diversi-
fied portfolios holding 50 percent equity and 50 percent bonds between
1967 and 1990, implicitly assuming quantitative portfolio restrictions are
replaced by "prudent man" rules. As noted, equity holdings are generally
below 50 percent (Table 5). Compared with Table 6, the results confirm
that returns may be boosted by raising the share ofequity, at some cost in
terms of risk, although the estimates suggest that risk is mitigated by
international diversification.sa Only for the United Kingdom are returns
consistently below those actually obtained; for the United States there is
little difference, since the portfolio approximates that actually held by
United States funds (Table 6). Several of the countries that fall below a
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TABLE9 Artificial Diversified Portfolios: Mean (and Standard Deviation) of Real Total Return,
1967-90 (percent - domestic currency)
Domestic - Domestic and Domestic and
Estimated International International
Portfolio Domestic and - Estimated - Average
Country Domestic' Return' International' Portfolio Return2 Earnings
United States 2.1 (12.9) -0.1 2.8 (12.5) +0.6 +2.6
United Kingdom 3.8 (14.8) -2.0 3.7 (14.1 ) -2.1 + 1.1
Germany 6.1 (15.2) +1.0 6.2 (13.4) +l.l +2.2
Japan 5.5 (15.5) +1.5 5.3 (14.3) +1.3 +l.l
Canada 2.2 (11.2) +0.6 2.2 (10.8) +0.6 +0.5
Netherlands 4.5 (17.0) +0.5 4.2 (15.2) +0.2 + 1.6
Sweden 3.8 (13.5) +3.6 3.7 (15.2) +3.5 +2.2
Switzerland 2.0 (15.4) +0.5 2.0 (12.3) +0.5 +0.1
Denmark 5.3 (18.9) +1.7 4.6 (13.4) +1.0 +1.8
Australia 2.7 (16.1 ) -l.l 2.8 (15.1) +1.2 +2.1
France 5.2 (18.0) 4.9 (15.9) +0.9
Italy 1.9 (22.1 ) 2.0 (18.7) -l.l
Source: Davis (1994a).
Note: 150% domestic equity. 50% domestic bonds.
'From Table 7.
'40% domestic equity, 40% domestic bonds, 10% foreign equity, 10% foreign bonds.
satisfactory return on assets relative to average earnings (such as Japan,
Australia, Denmark, and Sweden) would have found providing funded
pensions less costly (absolutely and relative to pay-as-you-go) if they had
followed such a rule. German funds would also have boosted their head-
room considerably.
In summary, this section suggests that support be given to a "prudent
man" rule, backed by flexible accounting and funding standards (per-
haps, as in the United Kingdom, focusing on income rather than market
value) to permit holding ofa proportion, varying with the maturity of the
fund, of high return but volatile assets. (It is not, of course, implied that a
100 percent equity portfolio would be anything but prudent). Since for-
eign investment is shown invariably to reduce risk, albeit often with a
slight reduction in return, limits on such holding are suggested to be
particularly counterproductive. Meanwhile, decentralized fund manage-
ment may be superior to centralized, if the poor performance of the
Swedish ATP fund can be generalized.
Conclusion
The diversity of experience in the external funding of private pensions
has been shown to be infl uenced particularly strongly by social security
and fiscal regulations, as well as by funding regulations per se. A generous
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and compulsory social security system across a broad range of incomes
can effectively "crowd out" private pensions, while discriminatory tax
treatment can discourage eXlernal funding. Such structures would seem
lo be counterproductive in the light of the higher return to funding
relative to pay-as-you-go both in a steady state and given the aging of the
population and the more adverse side effects of pay-as-you-go on eco-
nomic efficiency, as well as the greater risk and danger of inefficient
inveslmenl from "booking." An optimal system would probably include
only a minimal pay-as-you-go seclor catering for basic needs and for al-
leviation of poverty, with the bulk of earnings replacement being pro-
vided by private externally-funded plans. Only Australia (and Chile) ap-
proximate this at present.
Meanwhile the efficiency with which pension funds provide pensions is
influenced by regulations such as those of minimum funding and of
portfolios, as well as features such as taxation, accounting standards,
and the competitiveness of fund management. In effect, these prevent
the fund from reaching an optimal trade-off between risk and return. I
would suggest that streamlining such regulations so as to allow "prudent
man" rules and flexible funding limits may increase coverage of private
pensions by increasing their altractiveness to the sponsor or member or,
in the case of compulsory provision, reduce the cost of providing a given
level of private pensions in terms of competitiveness. Other issues that
arise in this context include the appropriate degree of risk for defined
contribution funds as opposed to defined benefit funds, and conversely,
the potential for excessively conservative investment strategies when em-
ployees are influential in fund management. Given the existing size and
importance of pension funds in the countries studied, as well as buoyant
prospects for development of occupational funded pensions in both Eu-
ropean Union and developing countries, these issues are ofconsiderable
importance.
I would like to thank Zvi Bodie, Olivia Mitchell, and participants at the
1994 Pension Research Council conference for helpful comments. The
views expressed are my own and not those of the Bank ofEngland, the Fi-
nancial Markets Group, or the EMI.
Notes
IThis chapter draws on Davis (1994a).
21n effect. younger members may accept occasional shortfalls in the coverage
of their pension rights while older workers continue to receive their pensions.
'The implicit assumption is that workers receive "acluarially fair" pensions
proportionate lo their contributions; in practice redistribution is common under
pay-as-you-go.
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'This discussion abstracts from distributional considerations. As noted below,
private funding tends to benefit those who have a sufficiently high income to save
during their working lives, whereas pay-as-you-go lends itself more readily to
redistribution.
'Conceptually, the discussion in this section applies to benefits obtainable for
"defined contributions," but for defined benefit schemes the reasoning is similar.
"Defined benefit" contribution rates under pay-as-you-go for a given population,
replacement rate (i.e., pension relative to final salary), and a pension indexed to
wages depend only on the dependency ratio. Under full funding, the contribu-
tion rate to obtain a similar replacement rate depends on the difference between
the growth rate of wages (which determines the pension needed for a given
replacement rate) and the return on assets, as well as the passivity ratio. For a
given population and population distribution, if the dependency ratio equals the
passivity ratio, the schemes will be equivalent if the growth rate of wages equals
the return on assets.
6An interest rate in excess of the economic growth rate is a prediction of most
theories of economic growth, given a positive rate of time preference (i.e., that
consumers require compensation for postponing consumption).
7In practice, average earnings growth may increase and the rate ofreturn to cap-
ital fall during the process of population aging, thus constituting a partial offset.
"That is, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, Ger-
many, andJapan.
"This risk is less important for defined benefit funds, as long as profitability of
firms is unaffected. Investment risk plus a collapse of profitability are needed to
threaten occupational defined benefit funds.
lOIn line with this suggestion, Blanchard (1993) has observed a decline in the
premium on equity relative to debt, and attributes this to institutionalization.
There remains a possibility that a switch to funding at a global scale could depress
the world rate of return.
"Even in a closed economy, this point should not be exaggerated. At least
ownership of the capital stock may be a more secure basis for retirement than the
willingness of existing workers to pay pensions as in pay-as-you-go schemes. If, as
suggested, funding raises saving relative to pay-as-you-go, then capital formation
and growth will be higher with funding and the national income from which
pensions must be paid correspondingly boosted.
12ln the model ofMerton (1983), all uncertainty regarding a worker's marginal
product derives from the aggregate production function, with no individual-
specific effects. Labor income is assumed to be perfectly correlated across individ-
uals. Workers save for retirement via individual saving (or defined contribution
pension funds). Since human capital cannot be traded, there is economic ineffi-
ciency, as individuals hold too much human capital early in their lives relative to
physical capital, while at retirement all wealth is invested in physical capital. These
rigidities prevent optimal sharing offactor share risk (i.e., relating to the division
ofGDP between wages and profits), which might, for example, derive from un-
foreseeable long-term secular trends related to the degree of union militancy or
technological developments. Merton shows that a pay-as-you-go social security
scheme is welfare-improving in this framework.
"This, in practice, depends on the benefit formula; it is not the case ifbenefits
are based on career-average revalued earnings.
"However, note that the trust fund invests solely in government bonds, which
has ambiguous consequences for benefit security.
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15Adequate provision of unfunded pensions is likely to be particularly difficult
for declining industries, as the worker/ pensioner ratio falls.
16Projections of inflation will be needed when benefit indexation is a contrac-
tual or legal obligation.
17This is guaranteed in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
18This is a legal obligation in Germany and Sweden and will soon be in the
United Kingdom; it is generally provided in Switzerland and the Netherlands.
19The facility with which funds of declining industries in the United Kingdom
funded on a PBO/IBO basis (such as coal mining and railways) coped with
maturity are a case in point.
2°Given the cost of this measure, a decline of the company pension fund sector
is predicted, but there is little evidence of this to date.
21Note that only long-maturity bonds will increase in price so as precisely to
offset the increase in liabilities.
22These limits do not, of course, apply to reserve funding systems such as those
common in Germany andJapan.
2'Technically, portfolio restrictions are likely to prevent managers from reach-
ing the frontier of efficient portfolios, which indicates where return is maximized
for a given risk.
24For example, by closing down all alternative investment strategies such as
international diversification.
250ne way to avoid the regulations on equities and foreign investment is report-
edly to invest via special security funds, whose investments are not subject to
restriction.
26The precise wording is that fund money must be invested "for the sole benefit
of the beneficiaries" and investments must be made with "the care, skill, pru-
dence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."
27There is no explicit prudent man rule, but the duty of prudence to trustees
can be interpreted as requiring diversification.
28Their analysis has been criticized for assuming that individuals realize capital
gains on equities each year, which seems unlikely to be the case.
29This approach, while being fully consistent with a prudent man rule, high-
lights the high risk nature of book reserve or pay-as-you-go provision for private
firms.
'OWhether holding equities does help in this sense is a matter of some contro-
versy in the literature. As noted by Tepper (1992), if equity returns are indepen-
dent from one period to the next, there remains a risk that a series of returns at
the tail of the distribution will occur, generating returns far lower than would be
possible with bonds. But if returns tend to revert to a mean level, for example due
to macroeconomic policy or even self-correcting tendencies in the economy, they
will act to prevent longer-term shortfall risk.
Such insights are formalized in so-<:alled asset-liability modeling exercises - an
actuarial technique that involves comparing forecasts ofliabilities in coming years
with asset returns under various scenarios; this shows both risks to the employer
and possible changes to portfolio strategy that may be warranted (Blake 1992).
31Also according to Wyatt (1993) there are unofficial tolerance limits for equity
exposure of 30 percent, imposed by the supervisors.
'2This point indicates the inflexibility of company-based defined contribution
plans seeking to cater both for risk-seeking young workers and risk-averse older
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ones. Some funds in Australia overcome this by offering four separate funds at
different levels of risk.
"Research by Mitchell (1994) suggests that employees' representation reduces
returns even for defined benefit funds, although in principle the employer is bear-
ing the risk.
"Annual holding period returns on marketable fixed rate instruments are
used, as in Table 7, instead of redemption yields. In my view, the holding period
returns are the more relevant measure for an ongoing portfolio, since they take
full account of losses or gains due to interest rate changes (although other as-
sumptions regarding holding periods could also be made).
"The return in the United States and Canada is considerably higher if the
sample begins in 1971 (4.0 percent and 2.7 percent respectively).
!6Knox (1993) shows that returns on a fund based on 12 percent contributions
with 45 years of payment invested, like current Australian pension funds, will
obtain an average replacement rate of 61 percent, but the range of statistical
probability of returns based on asset volatility in the past is between 35 percent
and 96 percent.
'"Employees may not contribute to book reserves or support funds.
'SThe table only shows international diversification up to 20 percent of the
portfolio, holding bonds and equities forthe "rest ofthe world" in proportion to
global portfolio weights in the 1980s. A full "global portfolio," where domestic
holdings are reduced to their weight in the global index, would imply 95 percent
international investment for the small countries and over 50 percent even for the
United States. Similar calculations for such a strategy (not shown in detail), with
again 50 percent bonds and 50 percent equities, again shows lower risk, although
the change in return may be in either direction.
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Comments by Marshall E. Blume
E. Philip Davis's chapter has two major themes. First, funded pension
plans are generally to be preferred to pay-as-you-go plans. Second, state-
supported pension plans, generally pay-as-you-go plans, "crowd out" pri-
vately funded pension plans. A related theme is that the investment strat-
egies of private pension funds are often less than optimal to obtain the
best possible returns due in part to restrictive government regulations
and excessive risk aversion on the part of those making the investment
decisions.
The chapter begins with Davis's reasoning for preferring funded pen-
sion plans over pay-as-you-go plans. The rest of the chapter contains
comparisons across a number of countries of the relative sizes of funded
pension plans and social security programs, the taxation and regulation
of pension plans, and the asset allocations and returns of the portfolios of
funded pension plans. The data presented in these comparisons are ex-
tremely interesting, and I recommend that they be carefully examined.
Let us now turn to the first major theme, that funded pension plans are
generally preferable to pay-as-you-go plans. The arguments that the au-
thor puts forward read almost like an apology, in the classical sense of an
explanation or a justification. Davis gives an extensive listing of favorable
features of funded pension plans and a shorter listing of favorable fea-
tures of pay-as-you-go plans. On the basis of these listings, he concludes
that "an optimal [pension] system would probably include only a mini-
mal pay-as-you-go sector catering for basic needs and for alleviation of
poverty, with the bulk of earnings replacement being provided by private
externally funded plans."
Davis may well be right in reaching this conclusion, but at least to this
commentator, the arguments put forward in reaching the conclusion are
not always persuasive and not as precise as they could be.
Davis's first reason for funding is that funding can generally provide
the same level of benefits to retirees with lesser outlays than pay-as-you-go
plans. Let us examine this reason in a very simple agrarian world contain-
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TABLE 1 Comparing Pay-as-You-Go and Funded Plans; The Effect on the First
and Succeeding Generations
Period
Status 1 2 3
Work Status
Original Farmer Works Retires
Son Works Retires
Grandson Works
Income
Original Farmer 1,000
Son 1,000
Grandson 1,000
Pay-as-you-go Plan Pension Contributions
Original Farmer a
Son 300
Grandson 300
Consumption
Original Farmer 1,000 300
Son 700 300
Grandson 700
Funded Plan Pension Contributions
Original Farmer 200
Son 200
Grandson 200
Funded Plan Consumption
Original Farmer 800 300
Son 800 300
Grandson 800
ing only a farmer and his son, who will take over the land when the father
retires. The father will die when his son retires, and his grandson wilI
then take over the farm. Mter the first generation, there will as a conse-
quence always be one person working the farm and one retired person.
Al; to finances, the farmer makes US$ 1,000 a year from farming the land,
and this income will remain unchanged into the future. There is a for-
eign bank that will accept deposits and that pays a positive interest rate.
The original farmer decides to set up a pension plan to provide 30 per-
cent of his yearly income as a retirement benefit, or US$ 300, and is con-
sidering a pay-as-you-go plan or a funded plan. lfhe chose a pay-as-you-go
plan, he will be able to consume US$ 1,000 a year during his working life
and at retirement will receive US$ 300 from his son, leaving his son and
all future generations with US$ 700 for consumption (Table 1).
If he chose a funded plan instead, he will have to save a portion of his
income each year. Because he can invest these savings with a bank, he
may have to save only US$ 200 to be able to have a retirement benefit
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of US$ 300 a year, which leaves during his working life US$ 800 a year
for consumption. Under this plan, succeeding generations will have
US$ 800 for consumption during their working career and US$ 300 for
retirement.
It is true that in this example, the funded plan, not taking into account
the time value of money, has a lower total ouday than does the pay-as-you-
go plan. But does this mean that the funded plan is better? It depends
upon the original farmer's trade-off between his utility of consumption
and his concern for the utility of future generations. Thus the com-
parison of total benefits to total oudays under the two plans is not ade-
quate to determine which plan is preferable.
Davis then turns to a political argument to justify funded plans over
pay-as-you-go plans. He points out correcdy that, if the G-7 countries
maintain the same benefits for their pay-as-you-go plans in the future as
today, these plans will require a very much greater proportion of GDP
than they do today. This greater demand on GDP could lead to "political
risks." But the author has not established that substituting funded plans
for pay-as-you-go plans is the correct policy response to this political issue;
perhaps, the benefits should be reduced.
Davis then raises but does not fully develop the notion that current
savings rates are too low. He suggests that, under certain "plausible"
conditions, the substitution of funded plans for pay-as-you-go plans will
increase savings rates and, if savings are invested properly, future eco-
nomic growth. Again, underlying this argument is a trade-off between the
utility of the current generation and future generations. But even if pol-
icymakers thought that the current savings rates were too low, there are
other ways of increasing savings, such as reducing the corporate tax rate.
The second major premise of the chapter is that pay-as-you-go pension
plans "crowd out" funded plans. There are some good theoretical rea-
sons for this contention, and the author presents them. The empirical
evidence supporting this argument is weak. Table 3 presents the replace-
ment rates of social security by country, and Table 2 contains measures of
pension assets to GDP by country. These series should be inversely re-
lated following the author's theory, but there does not appear to be such
a relation at least from a visual examination of the data.
A secondary thesis of the chapter is that pension funds should put
more money into equities. This is a very commonly held view, popular-
ized by McGeorge Bundy of the Ford Foundation in the mid-1960s, and is
based upon the empirical observation that in the last 50 or so years the
return on equities has exceeded the return of other commonly held fi-
nancial assets. Fifty years is a long time, and expectations should be borne
out. This is almost like a stochastic dominance argument - something
that was addressed in detail in the seventies by researchers such as Robert
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Merton and Paul Samuelson. What happens is that the probability of
doing worse with equities decreases with time, but for any finite horizon is
not zero. Thus, risk aversion comes into play.
Over even long horizons, the returns realized on the more risky assets
can be less than on less risky assets; that is what makes them risky. Indeed,
Jeremy Siegel (1992) found that in 16.9 percent of the decades over the
1926 to 1990 period, the returns on long-term governments bonds ex-
ceeded the returns on stocks, and there were even 2G-year periods when
returns on long-term governments exceeded the returns on stocks. Thus,
Davis has not demonstrated that every pension fund should necessarily
accept more risk and the corresponding greater expected returns. In
recent history, accepting this greater risk would have been a good strat-
egy, but there is no guarantee that the strategy will work over the next 10
or even 20 years.
Despite these objections, however, overall I found the chapter provoca-
tive. The comparison of pension plans across countries contains a wealth
of interesting data.
